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BALANCE SHEET VULNERABILITY AND
MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
IN INDONESIA
Miranda S. Goeltom
The economic and financial crises hitting Indonesia in 1997 have
triggered a significant economic downturn. A critical issue addressed
is how common shocks during crisis period have brought about
macroeconomic outcome. The paper briefly discusses the problems,
response and lessons learnt in the country’s effort to restore the
economy to its long-term potential growth path. By examining
balance sheet conditions across sectors in the economy, it is shown
that even though some progress has been achieved, overall balance
sheet conditions are still vulnerable to further shocks that may hit the
economy, so that efforts to restore economic growth and stability face
substantial challenges. Considering these constraints, Indonesian
macroeconomic policy makers focus their efforts on strengthening
financial markets, among others, by developing bond markets and
implementing banking architecture. However, various constraints
will remain unless the government speeds up the necessary reforms,
mostly institutional in nature.
Keywords: adjustment and reform program; balance sheet vulnerability; economic
crises (1997); Indonesia flow of funds; macroeconomic management
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Introduction
The economic and financial cri-
ses hitting Indonesia since mid-1997
had triggered a significant economic
downturn, especially in the banking
system, business sector, and social and
political environment. Mounting in-
flationary pressure along with battered
rupiah exchange rate further com-
pounded the deterioration of the eco-
nomic fundamentals. A vicious depre-
ciation-inflation spiral following the
excessive expansion of money supply
due to the bank run precipitated the
threat of hyperinflation. With confi-
dence in the banking system eroded,
the financial intermediary function of
banks virtually came to a halt, result-
ing in a sharp fall in production and
investment. It ended up with a deep
contraction of the entire economy, ac-
companied by heightened social and
political tensions emanating from mas-
sive unemployment and widespread
poverty.
To address the crisis, the govern-
ment pursued a number of policy mea-
sures on both demand and supply sides.
On the demand side, the policy fo-
cused on alleviating the negative im-
pact of the crisis on the poor by intro-
ducing a Social Safety Net Program,
followed by measures to revitalize in-
vestment and trade activities. On the
supply side, policies focused on struc-
tural adjustments in order to rehabili-
tate the banking and business sectors.
Meanwhile, efforts to contain infla-
tionary pressures proceeded with mon-
etary tightening and the easing of sup-
ply-side shortages through the exten-
sion of program credit and the reha-
bilitation of distribution chains.
The rest of the paper will briefly
discuss the problems, responses and
lessons learnt in the Indonesia’s effort
to restore the economy to its long-term
potential growth path, organized as
follows. Section 2 explores the bal-
ance sheet conditions during the crisis
and the beginning of economic recov-
ery. Section 3 traces the macro stabil-
ity adjustment programs conducted by
the Government and Bank Indonesia,
with the support of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Before the concluding remarks, sec-
tion 4 discusses the implication of asset
market dynamics and balance sheet
vulnerability on the current macroeco-
nomic management.
The Financial Crisis and
Balance Sheet Conditions
Before the crisis, i.e., in 1996 and
early 1997, Indonesia’s macroeco-
nomic indicators were strong. There
was a budget surplus, a modest –and
seemingly financeable– current ac-
count deficit, ongoing economic
growth and reasonable price, monetary
and exchange rate stability. The
Thailand’s currency crisis triggered
the crisis in Indonesia. Contagion
seems to have been the main instigat-
ing force for the crisis. The situation
was made worsen by the underlying
weaknesses and difficulties of
Indonesia’s economy, many of which
had been neglected during the previ-
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ous booming times. Most importantly,
there had been a build-up of unhedged
short-term borrowings in foreign cur-
rency by banks and corporates in the
months preceding the crisis. Unfortu-
nately, this build-up was not adequately
reflected in the data available at the
time.
All this not withstanding, the ef-
fects of the crisis on the Indonesian
real economy have been devastating.
Table 1 provides a summary of some
of these effects, e.g., the decline in
GDP, the drop in investment, the turn-
around in the balance of payments and
the implicit transfer of resources from
Indonesia abroad, the increase in infla-
tion, etc. Strains on the monetary
econo-my and financial system were
also not adequately reflected in the
aggregate numerical data. Pressures
on the exchange rate and reserves early
in the crisis forced the monetary au-
thorities to abandon the defense of the
exchange rate and let the rupiah float.
As a consequence, in such an open
capital economy, this shift in policy
was accompanied by enormous ex-
change rate volatility and overshoot-
ing.
There were other important ef-
fects of the crisis that were not ad-
equately reflected in Table 1, such as a
sudden fall in consumption levels, a
deterioration in living standard, and
thus the concomitant increase in pov-
erty. In this regard, the financial crisis
has reversed Indonesia’s track record
of steady poverty reduction for de-
cades. According to the best available
estimates, poverty rate1 increased dra-
matically, from 11.3 percent in 1996 to
23.6 percent in 1999. The crisis hit
urban areas more severely. However,
because of the linkages between urban
and rural areas, the repercussions of
the crisis were felt widely and resulted
in a steep rise in poverty in rural areas
and of Java as well. The Gini index
increased from 34.0 in 1993 to 36.0 in
1996 but then decreased from 1998 to
1999 (Circle-Indonesia, 2002).
The crisis also exhibited a desta-
bilizing dynamic, which in itself con-
stituted a vicious cycle. The loss of
confidence early in the crisis led to
bank runs. To prevent the collapse of
the banking system, Bank Indonesia
was obliged, as the lender of last re-
sort, to provide large-scale liquidity
support facilities to troubled banks,
temporarily losing monetary control
in early 1998. Stock of money soared,
pushed up prices, and further weak-
ened confidence. The increased money
stock, coupled with the loss of confi-
dence, led to further currency depre-
ciation, which in turn eroded confi-
dence, etc. A major victim of this cycle
was the Indonesian banking system,
which had largely borrowed and lent in
foreign currency. In addition, subse-
quent events have also revealed weak-
nesses in the system of prudential regu-
lation and supervision for the banking
system.
1 Incidence of Poverty (Head Count Index), estimated by International Labor Organization (2002).
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Suddenly banks’ borrowers were
unable to service their loans, convert-
ing effectively what the banks had
thought was a currency risk passed on
to the borrowers into a credit risk for
them. Non-performing loans grew dra-
matically (Figure 1), and the banking
system –or much of it– became techni-
cally insolvent (Figure 2).
A relevant question raised here is
how the common shocks during the
crisis period have brought about mac-
roeconomic outcome? In addressing this
issue, we need to examine balance sheet
conditions both at economy-wide and
sectoral levels, since some sectors of
the economy are highly vulnerable to
structural shocks. Key characteristics
of balance sheet conditions of different
sectors and country aggregates in the
full sample period during the crisis and
staggered economic recovery (1994-
2003) are reviewed in the following
section.
The Structure of Financing
Gap: The Overall Picture
Table 2 depicts the structure of
percentage of the financing gap to GDP
across sectors. Clearly, the economic
Figure 1. Non Performing Loans
Figure 2. Capital Adequacy Ratio
Source: Bank Indonesia
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crisis has brought about a decline in
the role of the government (public)
sector from 3.5 percent in 1997 to
minus 0.1 percent in 2001. It was
mainly due to the sharp increase in
government expenditure to provide the
Social Safety Net to the poor which
later on were mostly allocated to pro-
mote economic growth, and hence to
reduce gross public savings. After-
wards, during the economic recovery
process, the public sector showed re-
markable progress and reached 1.1
percent in 2003.
The corporate sector, both state-
owned and private, showed fluctuat-
ing developments. The state-owned
corporate sector experienced deficits
during the period of 1994-2003, ex-
cept in 1999 where it recorded a sur-
plus of 6.1 percent. It occurred be-
cause during 1999, both state and pri-
vate corporate sectors restrained to
invest as the political situation was
covered by uncertainties. The private
corporate sector experienced slightly
larger surpluses in 2001 and 2002. It is
worth noting that the net borrowings
of the private corporate sector were
generally larger than those of state
corporate sector, reflecting the limita-
tions faced by the State Corporate Sec-
tor to borrow externally because of
PKLN2 regulations. Despite some fluc-
tuations, the household sector was the
only sector which always experienced
surpluses during the period of 1994-
2003. It seems that declining corporate
businesses in the net borrowing was
substituted by other sector performance,
especially household.
It is interesting to observe the fluc-
tuations in the financial sector during
the period 1994-2003. As a result of the
tight monetary policies introduced in
1998 to absorb huge excess liquidity in
order to fight inflationary pressures,
banks had to bear high deposit interest
rate without capacity to lend the funds,
resulting in a huge negative spread.
This Credit Crunch depicting the inca-
pacitated banking sector as intermedi-
ary agent was the main cause of a
structural net borrowing position by
the financial sector. Meanwhile, non-
bank financial institutions generally
contributed less than one percent to
GDP.
The steady improvement in over-
all macro economy and socio-political
condition has gradually reversed the
picture and recorded the highest mo-
mentum in 2001 with a surplus of 2.9
percent of GDP. From Figure 3 it can
be seen that while saving and invest-
ment steadily increased, the net bor-
rowing (S-I) gap fluctuated during the
last decade. This confirms that the re-
covery process is staggering and is
vulnerable to subsequent shocks. The
following section explores a broad
scope of macroeconomic policies
aimed at maintaining stability in the
post crisis period.
2 PKLN (Pinjaman Komersial Luar Negeri) or Offshore Commercial Borrowing Regulation was
applicable to limit borrowing capacity of the State Corporate Sector.
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Table 2. The Structure of Net Borrowing by Sectors to GDP 1994–2003 (%)
Sector Average 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 94-96
A. Non Financial -3.74 -8 2.69 11.72 (3.64)           2.07           1.56 (1.16)
1. Government 1.74 3.45 0.57 0.51 0.79 (0.11) 0.79 1.07
2. Corporate -8.88 -13.67 -2.8 6.09 (5.45) (1.66) (1.83) (6.33)
          2.1. State -0.91 -1.23 -0.43 3.03 (2.43) (1.83) (2.00) (0.44)
          2.2. Private -7.97 -12.44 -2.37 3.06 (3.03) 0.17 0.17 (5.89)
3. Household 3.40 2.22 4.92 5.12 1.03 3.84 2.60 4.10
B. Financial 0.44 7.69 -2.03 -10.73 4.50 0.86 0.15 4.05
4. Bank* 0.28 7.97 -1.49 -10.42 4.50 0.93 0.07 4.05
5. Non-Bank 0.16 -0.28 -0.53 -0.31 0.01 (0.07) 0.09 (0.00)
C. External - - -  -  -  -
TOTAL 2.27 -0.31 0.67 0.99 0.87 2.93 1.71 2.89
GDP (billion Rp) 456,434 627,695 955,753 1,109,979 1,389,770 1,684,281 1,897,800 2,086,758
*) includes monetary authority
Source: Central Statistics Board
Figure 3. Net Borrowing of the Economy
Source: Central Statistics Board
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The Structure of Gross Savings
and Non-financial Investment
Table 3 shows the developments
of gross savings during the period of
1994-2003. It confirms the severity of
crisis experienced by the economy,
whereby gross saving as a percentage
of GDP dropped by more than a half
from around 30 percent in period be-
fore the crises to 13 percent in 1999.
Clearly, the government (public) sec-
tor was less volatile, with its largest
budget allocated mainly for debt prin-
ciple repayment and central govern-
ment spending. Meanwhile, the corpo-
rate sector experienced substantial fluc-
tuations, ranging from 24 percent to 95
percent of total gross saving in 1999. In
line with the corporate sector develop-
ments, the household sector also de-
picted similar fluctuations, ranging
from 15 percent to 56 percent of total
gross saving (households). The sub-
stantial increase in gross savings in
both sectors during the first three years
of the crisis (1997 to 1999) was mainly
due to the dramatic decline in the finan-
cial sector gross saving. Having expe-
rienced reversal developments, the cor-
porate and household sectors grew
steadily during the economic recovery
Table 3. The Structure of Gross Savings by Sectors 1994–2003 (%)
Sector Average 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 94-96
A. Non Financial 86.74 73.19 111.51 187.91 79.55 109.17 107.68 91.03
1. Government 24.74 28.06 24.33 37.01 21.54 15.98 22.33  28.31
2. Corporate 41.56 29.82 47.19 94.91  43.64  62.70  54.04  33.28
    2.1. State 7.64 5.9 9.04 28.33  6.24  17.27  23.45  19.79
    2.2. Private 33.92 23.92 38.15 66.57  37.40  45.43  30.60  13.49
3. Household 20.44 15.3 40 55.99  14.37  30.50  31.30  29.43
B. Financial 2.70 25.83 -8.19 -80.38  24.82  6.04  1.75  25.23
4. Bank* 2.04 26.21 -5.06 -78.3  24.54  6.18  1.08  24.97
5. Non-Bank 0.66 -0.38 -3.13 -2.07  0.28  (0.14)  0.67  0.26
C. External 10.55 0.99 -3.33 -7.53  (4.37)  (15.21)  (9.42)  (16.26)
6. External 10.55 0.99 -3.33 -7.53  (4.37)  (15.21)  (9.42)  (16.26)
TOTAL 100 100 100 100  100  100  100  100
Gross Saving
(billion Rp) 142,426 199,301 191,272 146,224  275,881  323,875  344,895  370,817
% of GDP 31.23 31.75 20.01 13.17  19.85  19.23  18.17  17.77
*) includes monetary authority
Source: Central Statistic Board, Bank Indonesia, Ministry of Finance
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period in 2001 and 2002. The steady
growth of these sectors was mainly
due to the strengthening of Asian cur-
rencies, especially against the US dol-
lar. This condition has also facilitated
government and central bank efforts in
maintaining macroeconomic and mon-
etary stability.
Interesting developments were also
shown by the banking sector (includ-
ing monetary authority), which not
only experienced some fluctuations,
but also contributed significantly to
the decline in total gross saving. In
1998 and 1999 it declined drastically to
a negative saving level, which was
mainly caused by ongoing banking re-
capitalization process. During the same
period, non-banking financial sector
also experienced the same situation.
This development was a logical conse-
quence of the weak banking system
and the fact that the corporate sector
was not well covered for exchange rate
risks.
Furthermore, Table 4 shows the
developments of non-financial invest-
ment structure during 1994-2003,
which declined sharply in 1998 and
1999, and gradually increased to 20
percent of GDP in 2000 and 18 percent
of GDP in 2003. Rather surprisingly,
unlike the structure of gross saving
which experienced substantial fluctua-
tions, non-financial investments re-
mained relatively stable. All sectors
Table 4.TheStructureofNon-financialInvestmentbySectors1994-2003(%)
Sector Average 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
94-96
A. NonFinancial 98.71 98.39 98.07 98.91 97.86 98.42 99.10 97.55
1.Government 19.17 17.21 21.49 33.17 17.58 16.55 17.98 22.27
2.Corporate 70.03 72.87 61.16 48.65 71.12 71.36 64.13 68.91
2.1.State 10.56 9.77 11.18 5.31 18.47 26.79 34.46 22.29
2.2.Private 59.47 63.1 49.98 43.34 52.64 44.56 29.67 46.62
3.Household 9.51 8.31 15.41 17.09 9.17 10.51 17.00 6.38
B. Financial 1.28 1.61 1.93 1.09 2.14 1.58 0.90 2.45
4.Bank* 1.14 1.12 2.39 0.82 1.89 1.36 0.71 2.16
5.Non-Bank 0.14 0.48 -0.46 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.29
C. External - - - - - -
6.External
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
GrossInvestment
(billionRp) 142,426 199,301 191,272 146,224 275,881 323,875 344,895 370,815
*)includesmonetaryauthority
Source:CentralStatisticBoard,BankIndonesia,MinistryofFinance
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(except non-bank in 1998) showed
positive investment rates. In 1999,
while the corporate and banking sec-
tors investment deteriorated, the gov-
ernment and household sectors showed
remarkable developments, with invest-
ments reaching the highest rate during
the period, above 30 percent and 15
percent of total non-financial invest-
ment, respectively.
The Macro Stability Program
During Financial Crisis
To deal with the crisis and unfold-
ing hyperinflation, difficult and tough
measures were required. A broad-based
policy package included four major
elements. First, a primary role was
given to a tightening of monetary poli-
cies, with a sharp increase in interest
rates and strict controls over base
money and net domestic assets to
achieve macroeconomic stabilization.
Second, an adjusted and less restric-
tive fiscal framework was imple-
mented, with the resulting fiscal defi-
cits in large part financed externally.
This expansionary fiscal stance was
designed to cover the costs of bank
restructuring and recapitalization, the
effects of devaluation on external com-
mitments and to provide Social Safety
Net measures to cushion the impact of
the crisis on the poor. Third, to address
the virtual collapse of the financial
system, an action program for restruc-
turing the banking system and recapi-
talizing the banks, including comple-
mentary measures to deal with corpo-
rate debt, was developed and imple-
mented. Finally, continuity was given
to a program of structural adjustment
and reform, focusing on measures to
increase efficiency and competitive-
ness.
Indonesian Monetary Policies
during the Crisis: Emphasis on
Stabilization
Although Bank Indonesia was
obliged to provide liquidity support to
banks undergoing bank runs in early
1998, monetary control was quickly
reestablished. Restrictive monetary
policies were implemented around
March 1998, with tight target ceilings
on base money resulting in slow mon-
etary growth. At the same time, inter-
est rates rose up to over 70 percent in
August. The focus of these policies
was mainly aimed at restoring price
stability, and indirectly along with other
factors to restore stability in the for-
eign exchange market.
A question is whether these policy
actions, along with their results, could
have been achieved without consider-
able freedom given to Bank Indonesia.
There were clearly short-term costs in
terms of output loss driven by high
interest rates. The absence of pressure
to ease monetary aggregates has al-
lowed Bank Indonesia to target its
policies on price (and exchange rate)
stability and succeeded in bringing
inflation down within a relatively short
period
Using the postulates and analyti-
cal tools of modern welfare econom-
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ics, a number of economists advanced
theoretical arguments that central bank
independence increases economic
welfare (see Cukierman 1992, and
Lippi 1999). Credibility in monetary
policy, enhanced by central bank inde-
pendence, would increase efficiency
and provide a nominal anchor in itself.
In May 1999 a new Central Bank Law
was enacted providing a new legal
framework for Indonesia’s central
bank. Price stability became the single
objective of Bank Indonesia, equipped
with both ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’ inde-
pendence.3 In the new Central Banking
Law, the Governor of Bank Indo-
nesia is no longer a member of the
Cabinet, although he may participate
in meetings of interest. Nor is there
any longer a member of the Govern-
ment (from the Ministry of Finance)
on the Board of Governors for Bank
Indonesia. Another most important
thing is the prohibition of Bank Indo-
nesia under the new legal framework
to provide credits or loans to the Gov-
ernment.
While the new law provides con-
siderable scope of independence of
action for Bank Indonesia in achieving
the stipulated objective, there are also
provisions for its accountability. In ad-
dition to its accountability in carrying
out its functions and meeting its objec-
tive, Bank Indonesia is subject to in-
ternationally standardized financial
controls and auditing. Furthermore,
under this new legal framework, Bank
Indonesia is to announce inflation tar-
gets as part of its reporting functions.
This presumes that Bank Indonesia is
able to both forecast inflation and freely
aim its policy on reaching inflation
targets. Bank Indonesia also has to set
guidelines under a loosely termed “In-
flation Targeting” framework.
In 2002, three years after the imple-
mentation of the Central Bank Law,
promising economic developments
started to materialize. Although sev-
eral underlying factors played signifi-
cant roles, it is believed that the mon-
etary institutional establishment was
the main aspect fostering economic sta-
bility, not only in the short run, but also
in the long-run. During 2003, consis-
tent monetary policies supported by
prudent fiscal policies and other
progresses achieved in economic re-
structuring have contributed to macro-
economic and monetary stability. The
inflation rate declined significantly to
about 5 percent in 2003, from an aver-
age of 10 percent over the 2000-2002
period. Consequently, these conditions
provided adequate room for monetary
policy to consistently adjust interest
rates in order to support further eco-
nomic recovery process.
Prudent Fiscal Policy Support
the Effort to Stabilize the
Economy
Three decades of prudent fiscal
management had resulted in a very
low public debt in Indonesia, prima-
3 Law No. 23, May 1999, available on the BI website www.bi.go.id. As amended in February 2004
in Bank Indonesia Law No. 03/2004, inflation rate target is set by the Government (Minister of Finance)
after consultation with Bank Indonesia, and hence remove the “goal independence.”
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rily external debt. This trend was re-
versed when the crisis occurred. There
was an adjusted and less restrictive
fiscal framework, resulting in fiscal
deficits largely financed by external
sources. This expansionary fiscal stance
was mainly caused by the huge costs of
bank restructuring and recapitalization,
negative impact of devaluation on ex-
ternal commitments and Social Safety
Net measures for the poor. This inevi-
tably led to the increase in the govern-
ment debt, as depicted in the table
below. It is clear that the economic
crisis has constrained government bud-
get developments, which experienced
substantial increase in budget deficit,
from 2.5 percent in 1997 to 5.7 percent
in 1998.
On the expenditure side, a huge
amount of Fixed Rate Bonds (FRB)
with maturity between 3 to 10 years
were issued to increase banks’ Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) up to 4 per-
cent, while Variable Rate Bonds (VRB)
were issued to increase banks’ nega-
tive CAR to 0 percent. Government
also issued Hedge Bonds (HB) to cover
banks’ liabilities in foreign currency,
revalued quarterly to reflect the ru-
piah/dollar exchange rate. On top of
that, and not included in the public
debt position, are the contingent li-
abilities associated with the Blanket
Guarantee program provided to the
banking system, which was introduced
January 1998 to stop bank run and
restore public confidence to the bank-
ing system. As discussed in section 2,
the financial crisis has reversed
Indonesia’s track record of steady pov-
erty reduction for decades, increasing
the poverty rate from 11.3 percent in
1996 to 23.6 percent in 1999, destabi-
lizing the socio-economic condition.
A huge amount of government expen-
Table 5. Government Bonds Portfolio (in trillion Rp)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Outstanding % Outstanding %
Based on Serial 281.8 100 431.8 435.3 419.3 403.4 100
Fixed Rate 51.2 18.2 179.4 175.4 154.4 159.0 39.4
Variable Rate 203.9 72.3 219.5 219.5 239.6 231.4 57.4
Hedge Bond 26.6 9.5 32.8 40.4 25.3 12.9 3.2
Based on Ownership 281.8 100 431.8 435.3 419.3 403.4 100
Recap. Bank 281.8 100 423.0 396.6 359.8 307.0 76.1
Non-Recap.Bank - 6.6 24.8 13.8 27.4 6.8
Sub-Registry - 1.8 13.0 44.8 68.9 17.1
Traded in Sec.Market - 31.6 64.6 99.7 190.5 47.2
Total 281.8 100 431.8 435.3 419.3 403.4 100
Source: Bank Indonesia
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ditures were allocated for a Social
Safety Net Program, among others by
direct aid to help the poor meet their
basic needs and providing direct credit
to Small Farmers Cooperatives (KUT)
and Small Trade Cooperatives (KUD)
through the Ministry of Cooperatives
and Small Scale Business (Table 5).
The fiscal deficits, which were
largely financed by inflows of official
capital from abroad, have led to higher
public debt. In the immediate future,
the pressing problem for the govern-
ment is how to service this higher
public debt. This will exacerbate pres-
sures on the government budget, which
has already been weakened by declin-
ing tax revenues, high interest pay-
ments and large energy subsidies. In
this regard, despite efforts to raise taxes
and improve tax administration, a de-
cline in economic activity caused the
drop of non-oil revenues from 13.1
percent (of GDP) in 1997 to 11.9 per-
cent in 1998. Fortunately, external fac-
tors such as declining interest rates and
higher oil prices provide some reprieve
(Kuncoro 2004).
To remedy budgetary pressures,
which are expected to continue in the
following years, a range of pre-emptive
budget actions is being undertaken,
among others macro stability pro-
grams. On the revenue side these in-
clude raising tax revenues especially
from the removal of VAT (value added
tax) exemptions, better tax and cus-
toms administration, and reduction in
tax incentives. Meanwhile, on the ex-
penditure side, they include cutting
expenditures on untargeted subsidies
like energy and interest rate subsidies.
Table 6. Revenues and Expenditure in Indonesia (as % of GDP)
Revenue
Year Total Budget Foreign aid /
Non- Oil &Gas Total Expenditure Deficit Borrowing
oil
1994 13.8 3.5 17.4 19.6 -2.2 2.6
1995 12.5 3.5 16.1 17.4 -1.4 2.0
1996 12.7 3.8 16.5 18.5 -2.0 2.2
1997 13.1 4.9 18.0 20.5 -2.5 2.3
1998 11.9 4.2 16.1 21.8 -5.7 5.7
1999 13.0 5.0 18.0 21.9 -3.9 3.9
2000 9.3 5.5 14.8 15.9 -1.2 0.7
2001 12.8 5.1 17.9 20.3 -2.4 0.6
2002 13.0 5.5 18.5 20.0 -1.5 0.4
2003 13.5 5.5 19.1 21.2 -2.1 0.2
Source : Ministry of Finance
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In fact, such actions have brought about
significant positive results, not only in
terms of the declining budget deficits,
but also creating sound environment
for economic recovery process. Table
6 depicts the progress achieved, with
budget deficits substantially declining
from 5.7 percent in 1998 to 3.9 percent
in 1999, and 1.1 percent in 2000. Fur-
ther promising situation for fiscal
sustainability was reflected by the low
budget deficit during 2002 and 2003,
which reached 1.8 percent and 1.6 per-
cent, respectively.
The question is then whether the
deficit can be sustained. Mahi and
Jasmina (2000) estimated a fiscal
sustainability model for Indonesia. They
found that the level of actual opera-
tional deficit as a percentage of GDP
during 1990–l998 was lower or at the
same level of sustainable operational
deficit, with 1990 as exception. This
means that the required deficit reduc-
tion must be close to zero. One can thus
conclude that during those years, the
government successfully achieved a
sustainable level of foreign public debt.
One special case is in 1998 where the
actual operational deficit jumped to 8.6
percent while the sustainable level re-
quired no more than 5 percent of GDP.
This is not surprising since in 1998 the
economic crisis was at its worst.
Another agenda was related to the
central and local government relation-
ships. Before 2000, for about thirty
years, Indonesia has been known for its
highly centralized fiscal system. The
proportion of total revenues raised by
local governments was very low by
international standards. Using 1982-
1983 fiscal years as an illustration, the
transfer from the central government
was more than 60 percent of provincial
government routine revenues. Mean-
while, within the development budget,
the largest contribution came from the
central government’s capital transfer,
which accounted for around 40 per-
cent of the provinces’ development
revenues. A similar pattern can be ob-
served for district government, where
about 50 percent of their routine bud-
gets and 39 percent of their develop-
ment budget were provided by the
central government (Alisjahbana
2000).
Efforts to Revive the Banking
Sector
Banking industry is one of the
sectors hardest hit by the crisis and
remained under downward pressure.
The frail banking structure as a result
of internal deficiencies was exacer-
bated by adverse external forces, such
as exchange rate turbulences, high in-
terest rates, social and political uncer-
tainty, and a wide range of negative
rumors that triggered bank runs. The
depreciating rupiah, followed by rising
interest rates due to policy tightening to
stabilize prices and the exchange rate
encountered banks with a negative net
interest margin. The negative spread
caused further losses and reductions of
bank equity capital. The high interest
rate environment interrupted the inter-
mediary function of the banks as they
faced onerous difficulties in extending
credit.
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Settlement of the banking issue
had to initially address the structural
internal deficiencies. The low level of
competence and integrity of bank
management resulted in poor risk man-
agement as highlighted by numerous
violations of prudential principles,
high-risk investments and imprudent
funding strategy. Added to these inter-
nal weaknesses was an emphatically
inadequate internal control. Accord-
ingly, banks’ performance was in
shambles, as reflected in their unbal-
anced balance sheet in both asset and
liability sides.
On the asset side, the main prob-
lem was the deteriorating quality of
productive assets. This problem origi-
nated from credit lending that was not
based on sound lending criteria. Ex-
cessive credits were extended to cer-
tain groups and banks’ subsidiaries in
the form of connected lending that
resulted in numerous violations of the
legal lending limit. Another major
problem came from a large portion of
lending to high-risk sectors, most no-
tably property. On the liability side,
the main problem was a mismatch of
currencies and maturities with short-
term un-hedged foreign loans used to
finance long-term rupiah-generating
projects. In addition, the negative
spread during the reporting period
magnified the substantial loss from the
mismatch and introduced a larger re-
tained loss in the thin equity base of the
banks. Consequently, banks became
considerably more susceptible to dis-
ruptive changes.
The internal deficiency in the bank-
ing industry was also associated with
ineffective banking supervision. There
were five constraints that shaped the
ineffectual bank supervision. First, in-
sufficient number of supervisors. Sec-
ond, inadequate early warning systems.
Third, a conflicting dilemma between
consistent implementation of the regu-
lations and concerns over likelihood of
systemic failures. Fourth, the absence
of standard operating procedures to
exercise exit policy (a policy that de-
scribes ways for any bank to exit from
the banking system) that had in fact
resulted in moral hazard. Fifth, fre-
quent interference from connected par-
ties that hindered any policy remedy
from materializing.
Banking restructuring program
has been implemented into various
comprehensive and concrete actions
under a new sound and sustainable
banking system, restore public confi-
dence on national banking system and
revitalize its function as financial in-
termediation institution. Banking re-
structuring to date has involved clo-
sure of unviable institutions, mergers
of the banks taken over, removal of
non-performing loans from banks’
balance sheets, and recapitalization of
banks under the Indonesian Bank Re-
structuring Agency (IBRA). In essence,
the Government, jointly with Bank
Indonesia, has taken strategic and com-
prehensive policies aiming at restor-
ing public confidence, both domesti-
cally and internationally, toward the
Indonesian banking industry and
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at encouraging the bank restructuring
process. Those policies include: (i) the
in-troduction of a Government Guar-
antee Scheme, (ii) the establishment of
IBRA, (iii) the recapitalization of banks,
and (iv) corporate sector restructuring
(See Appendix 1).
Learning from the crisis, in addi-
tion to inadequate legal infrastructure
to enforce banks’ prudential principles,
the lax enforcement of laws and regula-
tions has also become an important
source of banking problems. As a re-
sult, the Government and Bank Indone-
sia enacted several Acts and improved
several prudential regulations in line
with international standards and best
banking practices. Throughout the cri-
sis period, the Government has pro-
mulgated the Banking Act, the Central
Bank Act, the Act of Foreign Exchange
Traffic and Exchange Rate System.
In the same time, Bank Indonesia
has legislated and amended various
prudential regulations, aiming at pro-
viding a basis for good corporate gov-
ernance. Bank Indonesia has also en-
acted regulations pertaining to the bank-
ing institutional framework. Such regu-
lations govern the prerequisites of bank
establishment, changes in bank organi-
zation and ownership, which are part of
bank’s entry criteria. Furthermore, an
exit policy criterion was explicitly ap-
plied to banks under special surveil-
lance by IBRA, while prompt correc-
tive actions are to be taken within de-
fined periods. Bank supervision strate-
gies were improved in line with interna-
tional standards.
As a result of the above measures,
there have been significant changes in
banks’ balance sheets since 1999. The
following figures compare the evolving
composition of sources and uses of
funds in the banking sector from 1994-
2003 (Figure 4 and 5). In line with
economic recovery and increased pub-
lic confidence on the banking system,
the Third Party Funding, which is domi-
nated by Savings and Time deposits,
has steadily increased while subse-
quently reducing offshore and inter-
bank borrowing. This encouraging de-
Figure 4. Banking Sector Sources of Funds (%)
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velopment in the liabilities side was
further strengthened by the increasing
capital base of the banking system,
from negative 41 trillion rupiah (ap-
proximately USD 500 billion) by the
end of 1999 to a positive 110 trillion
rupiah (approximately USD 1200 bil-
lion) by 2003. As a result, shown in the
earlier figures, the Non Performing
Loan declined substantially to a low 5
percent in 2003.
On the other hand, private credit,
which was mainly consumer’s credit,
has also moved in the same higher
direction, with the decline in other
assets. However, the structure of the
asset side of the banking system was
still overwhelmed by the Government
Recap Bonds, which, until late 2002,
were practically illiquid. Only after
the creation of a Debt Management
Unit under the Ministry of Finance,
trading of Recap Bonds started to in-
crease gradually, resulting in a declin-
ing shares of Government Bonds in the
Banking Assets.
Corporate Restructuring
Efforts to restructure the banking
system were then complemented by
steps to restructure distressed corpora-
tions. Three agencies, namely IBRA,
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency
(INDRA), and Jakarta Initiative Task
Force (JITF) have been assigned to
conduct corporate restructuring. In
addition, Bank Indonesia has also in-
stituted a special Task Force dealing
with Loan Restructuring and Optimi-
zation, functioning as facilitator be-
tween debtors and creditors. Its activi-
ties involve providing debtor informa-
tion, arranging meeting between credi-
tors and debtors, acting as mediator
and observer, and providing technical
assistance.
Figure 5. Banking Sector Uses of Funds (%)
Source: Bank Indonesia
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As an alternative approach to re-
settle private debts outside the bank-
ing system, the Government estab-
lished INDRA. Basically, this scheme
offers Forward Foreign Exchange
Cover, provided that debtor compa-
nies have serviced their monthly obli-
gation in rupiah through INDRA, at a
favorable exchange rate based on
twenty-day moving averages. Under
INDRA, corporate debt is rescheduled
with interest payments paid in rupiah
with a three-year grace period, while
the principal is to be paid on the fourth
up to the eighth year.
Meanwhile, an additional frame-
work called “The Jakarta Initiative”
was launched to complement the newly
amended bankruptcy law and facili-
tate the bank restructuring agenda along
with the INDRA scheme. This frame-
work contains principles to resolve
private sector debt problems through
an out-of-court resolution with credi-
tors so that these companies might
have access to working and new capi-
tal. The Jakarta Initiative includes: (i)
facilitating out-of-court negotiations;
(ii) providing a forum for expedited
“one-stop facilitation” of all regulator
filings necessary to implement a re-
structuring plan; and (iii) providing
recommendations on any legal, regula-
tory, or administrative changes needed
to further facilitate corporate restruc-
turing. Assistance to the Jakarta Initia-
tive is to be provided by the World
Bank, along with targeted assistance to
small and medium-size enterprises by
the ADB.
It is worthy to note that although
both INDRA and JITF were consid-
ered ineffective due to their voluntary
natures, somehow the gradual improve-
ment in macro-economic fundamentals
have brought about a better capacity
for the corporate sectors to tap other
funding sources.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 compare the
evolving composition of sources and
Figure 6. Corporate Sector Uses of Funds (%)
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uses of funds in the corporate sector
from 1994-2003. Figure 6 shows that
before the crisis, private sector fund-
ing came primarily from banking
credit. The 1997 crisis which was fol-
lowed by subsequent credit crunch
forced the corporate sector to rely more
on non-bank financing sources, mainly
by issuing stocks, and gradually move
to issue more bonds following the emer-
gence of a government bonds yield
curve. On the other hand, the strike of
crisis was noticed significantly on the
sharp decline of (non financial) invest-
ments. Meanwhile, Figure 7 shows
that during the peak of crisis period,
investment continuously declined and
reached its lowest level in 1999. It is
interesting to note that, in the same
period, corporate sector tended to hold
cash/ deposits and even spent expenses
for building up owner equity. This
shifting was only temporary in nature,
since in line with the economic recov-
ery, investment rose gradually to higher
levels than before the crisis.
From previous exploration, it can
be noted that while household sector
was the only sector which always ex-
perienced surplus during the 1994-
2003 period, it seems that this was also
a substitution of declining performance
of corporate businesses. Therefore, it
worth observing household sector’s
behavior during the crisis. In this re-
gard, Figure 8 depicts household sec-
tor expenses structure from 1994-2003.
It can be seen that, compared to the
pre-vious years, in 1997 this sector
spent more funds on insurance and
pension activities and, on the other
hand, held less cash and deposits. When
the crisis reached its highest momen-
tum, during 1998 and 1999, household
expenses on credits to other sectors in
the economy gradually increased and
Figure 7. Corporate Sector Sources of Funds (%)
Source: Bank Indonesia
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Figure 8. Household Sector Expenses Structure (%)
Source: Central Statistic Board (Flow of Fund Data)
reached their highest level. Meanwhile,
besides cash and deposits, owner eq-
uity on business sectors was still rec-
ognized as a preferable option during
economic recovery process.
External Debt Restructuring
Until the crisis hit the country in
1997, total national debt has acceler-
ated significantly (Table 7 and Table
8). The ratio of private sector debt to
total national debt increased steadily
from 12.6 percent in 1980, to 29.5
percent in 1990 and 81 percent in 1998.
The financial crisis in 1997 reversed
the trend, and private debt declined to
20 percent in 2003.4 On the other hand,
public foreign debt increased signifi-
cantly during the crisis, mainly due to
the increase of IMF loan from 1997 to
2000 by USD 3,03 billion equivalent,
USD 5,8 billion, USD 1,4 billion and
USD 1,1 billion respectively. By 2004,
total loans from IMF reached USD
11.3 billion.
As the economy was in the brink of
collapse, for the first time in our his-
tory, on September 23, 1998 the gov-
ernment entered a negotiation under the
auspices of Paris Club creditor nations
which had agreed to reschedule $4.4
billion in principal payments. The prin-
cipal of Official Development Assis-
tance loans was rescheduled with a
twenty-year maturity and a five-year
grace period, while export credits were
4 Since mid 2003, Indonesian blue chip corporates such as Medco and Indofood, as well as some
State Banks such as Bank Mandiri and Bank BNI went back to the international market by issuing bonds
or Floating Rate Notes (FRN).
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Table 7. Indonesian Total Foreign Debt (Percentage)
Indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 World Bank
Criteria
Debt Service Ratio 35.9 30.3 35.9 44.5 57.9 56.8 41.1 41.4 33.1 27.1 20
Total Debt to Export 230.7 227.2 232.9 207.3 261.8 252.1 191 200.7 193.9 188.6 130-220
Total Debt to GDP 55.7 64.8 65.1 62.2 146.3 105 93.8 91.1 76 62.9 50-80
Source: Bank Indonesia
Table 8. Indonesian Total Foreign Debt by Sector
(Billion USD)
Private Debt
End of Period Government Bank Corp Bond Non Bank Total Total Foreign
Debt Debt
1994 58.6 8.6 1.4 28.3 38.3 96.9
1995 59.6 10.1 1.9 36.3 48.2 107.8
1996 61.9 9.0 2.4 43.4 54.9 116.7
1997 53.9 14.4 10.3 57.6 82.2 136.1
1998 67.3 10.8 2.1 70.7 83.6 150.9
1999 75.9 10.8 1.0 60.4 72.2 148.1
2000 74.9 7.7 1.2 57.9 66.8 141.7
2001 71.4 6.6 1.1 53.9 61.6 133.0
2002 74.7 4.9 2.8 44.4 52.0 126.7
2003 81.7 4.3 1.8 32.2 38.3 120.0
(Percentage of GDP)
Private Debt
End of Period Government Bank Corp Bond Non Bank Total Total Foreign
Debt Debt
1994 33.7 4.9 0.8 16.3 22.0 55.7
1995 35.8 6.0 1.1 21.8 29.0 64.8
1996 34.5 5.0 1.3 24.2 30.6 65.1
1997 24.6 6.6 4.7 26.3 37.6 62.2
1998 65.3 10.5 2.0 68.5 81.0 146.3
1999 53.8 7.7 0.7 42.8 51.2 105.0
2000 49.6 5.1 0.8 38.3 44.2 93.8
2001 48.9 4.6 0.7 36.9 42.2 91.1
2002 44.8 2.9 1.7 26.6 31.2 76.0
2003 42.8 2.3 0.9 16.9 20.1 62.9
Source: Bank Indonesia
262
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2005, Vol. 7, No. 2
rescheduled with an eleven-year ma-
turity and a three-year grace period. A
milestone agreement on Indonesian
private debt restructuring was reached
in Frankfurt in June 1998. The Frank-
furt agreement covered three areas:
inter-bank debt, trade maintenance fa-
cilities, and corporate debt. With re-
spect to the inter-bank debt, a settle-
ment of $3.02 billion bank obligations
falling due prior to April 1, 1999 were
replaced by new loans guaranteed by
Bank Indonesia with payment tranches
of one, two, three, and four years.
In addition, a second restructuring
step was announced by the London
Club Steering Committee in March
1999, in which another $3.3 billion of
eligible debts owed by Indonesian
banks falling due within April 1, 1999
until December 31, 2001 (excluded
payment as a result of previous ex-
change offer) has been tendered by
creditors. The eligible debts were rec-
onciled and exchanged for new loans
under Bank Indonesia guarantee for
default payment with four types of
tranche maturities and the first pay-
ment for the new loan will be due on
2002. As of July 6, 1999, out of $3.3
billion outstanding debts, $3.2 billion
has been reconciled and exchanged.
As regards to trade maintenance
facilities, individual foreign banks
agreed to maintain their trade financ-
ing facilities amounting to $2.9 billion
with guarantee from Bank Indonesia.
This agreement became effective as of
April 1998. As of June 8, 1999, the
outstanding facility has reached $1.1
billion. Trade maintenance facilities
were extended up to June 2000, which
covers guarantee of trade maintenance
facilities up to December 2000. Fur-
thermore, to maintain sustainability of
export performance, Indonesia has es-
tablished a co-operation with 7 inter-
national export credit agencies, namely
Japan EXIM, GSM USA, CWB
Canada, US EXIM bank, ECGD UK,
EDC Canada, and KFW Germany. In
total this facility amounted to roughly
$2.6 billion.  More recently, a legal
framework to operate a newly Indo-
nesia’s Export Bank was established.
This agency is designed to support the
financing of export activities in Indo-
nesia. These debt restructuring pro-
grams have allowed the country to allo-
cate its limited resources to fund the
bank recapitalization and Social Safety
Net program.
Preliminary Result: Improving
Macroeconomic Indicators
The results of this economic ad-
justment and reform program, while
painful, are increasingly well known.
There has been a major progress in the
restoration of macroeconomic stabil-
ity, supported by sound monetary poli-
cies. The risk of deepening hyperinfla-
tion in 1998 was averted and inflation
has since abated. The rupiah has
strengthened and exchange rate stabil-
ity was restored in a free market envi-
ronment. Consistently with the re-
newed macroeconomic balance, pres-
sures on interest rate abated along with
improvement in risk premium, a steady
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appreciation of rupiah, increase in for-
eign exchange reserves to a high record,
and of share values on the Jakarta
Stock Exchange (JSX). With the re-
stored macroeconomic stability and
renewed business confidence, signs of
incipient recovery in the real economy
take place and the GDP gradually re-
bounds, confirmed by improved lead-
ing indicators. The economic recov-
ery, while still fragile and beset with
uncertainties, appears to be ongoing
and widening its base. (See also Ap-
pendix 2)
Balance Sheet Vulnerability
and Management Post IMF
Program
As investigated in the previous
section, most sectors were still vulner-
able to common shocks. This vulner-
ability was not only reflected by fluc-
tuations in the net borrowing of these
sectors, but also cyclical patterns in the
net borrowing of the whole economy.
Under such condition, small shocks
that hit the banking sector, for instance,
might be spread substantially to the
whole economy. Therefore, to main-
tain strong economic performance
ahead, preemptive sound macroeco-
nomic policies must be implemented
consistently. In addressing what fac-
tors affecting balance sheets vulner-
ability and how these conditions would
impact the economy is not an easy task
and is a part of a long research agenda.
Without loss of generality, this section
addresses two related issues, namely
the behavior of asset market dynamics
and the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
Asset Market Dynamics and
Monetary Policy: Preliminary
Investigation
The asset market dynamics, re-
flected by the movement of asset price
index, could be related to balance sheet
developments and financial stability,
thus economic performance as a whole.
The experiences from other countries
indicate co-relationship between asset
prices and financial stability. From theo-
retical perspectives, asset price fluc-
tuation may cause balance sheet per-
formance, and consequently affect in-
vestment decisions. Therefore, it is
important to carefully examine the im-
pact of asset price movements on vari-
ous economic sectors if stability is to be
maintained.
Complications in the above issues
emerge in the context of the unique
characteristics of the Indonesian
economy. As explored in the previous
section, the Indonesian economy still
experiences “staggered” recovery while
most sectors were vulnerable to further
common shocks. Consequently, it is
very difficult to predict how large asset
market dynamics affect the economy,
and therefore their role in macroeco-
nomic management design. The fol-
lowing section will explore a prelimi-
nary investigation on asset market dy-
namics and a broad scope of macroeco-
nomic policies towards maintaining
stability during the post crisis period.
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Despite significant impact of asset
market dynamics on the Indonesian
economy, asset prices in Indonesia tra-
ditionally do not play a prominent role
as important indicators in the design of
macro (monetary) policy. Unlike de-
veloped countries, Indonesian Capital
Markets are still far from mature. As a
result, the role of asset price develop-
ment was quite insignificant to mon-
etary policy decision-making process.
Consequently, the role of asset prices
in the transmission process of mon-
etary policy was largely disregarded.
From a preliminary study on asset
market dynamics, stock prices (JSX) in
particular are considered to contain
less valuable information in the final
target of monetary policy. The fact that
non-residents hold 67 percent of stocks
issued, and that only 70 thousand (or
0.03% of total population) investors
are registered at the Indonesian Central
Securities Depository might explain
the failure of JSX index in transmitting
monetary policy to its final target
(Warjiyo and Agung, 2001). However,
the increased financing to property sec-
tor and improved role of the capital
market implicitly send a signal to mon-
etary policy makers to reconsider the
dynamics of asset prices in the forma-
tion of monetary policies. In this re-
spect, asset prices in particular are
thought to contain valuable informa-
tion and therefore should have been
taken into account in conducting mon-
etary policies.
As a result, a composite asset price
index was constructed and is composed
of several assets holding, namely resi-
dential assets, commercial asset and
equity. The result of construction of
asset price index is demonstrated in
Figure 9.
Figure 9. Indonesia Composite Asset Price Index
Source: Bank Indonesia
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Up to mid 1997, the increase in
the asset price was in line with the
period of high economic expansion.
Extensive credit lines, especially to
the property sector, boosted up the
price of land, housing and commercial
properties. Many new residential es-
tates were developed throughout big
cities along side with the construction
of high-rise office buildings. This cre-
ated a so-called bubble in the economy.
As the market will correct any devia-
tion from fundamentals, so was this
asset price movement. The economic
crisis crashed the property sector and
prices dropped severely. However, as
the leading sector in the expansion pe-
riod is improving, the hope of recovery
created confidence towards the Indone-
sian economy. This positive expecta-
tion was mirrored in the increasing
price of asset.
Meanwhile, the results of the study
concludes that when the role of com-
posite asset price index in monetary
policy transmission is questioned, the
results signify the existence of asset
price channel of monetary transmis-
sion through both consumption and
investment channels. Also, the infor-
mation content of inflation (the final
target of monetary policy) that can be
explained by changes of monetary
policy through asset price channel us-
ing investment path is slightly higher
than that of consumption path. The
slightly lower information content
through consumption channel might
relate to the long lags substitution ef-
fect.
The Impact of Balance Sheet
Adjustment on Monetary Policy
Transmission
Looking at the sectoral level,
banks’ behaviors in making balance
sheet adjustments by selecting their
portfolio compositions can also play an
important role in explaining mon-
etary policies transmission (Silber
1969, and Beckhart 1940). Within
banks’ portfolio, a special attention
has been given to credits, as this type
of asset will be the most dominant
portfolio in a normal and well func-
tioning bank. The growing awareness
of the importance of credit in mon-
etary policy transmission process is
driven among others by concerns over
the impact of financial sector weak-
nesses, bank failures, non performing
loans (NPLs), and credit rationing on
the effectiveness of the transmission
process (see e.g., Blinder (1987),
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Brunner
and Metzler (1988)). In the past, mon-
etary literature had paid little attention
on the role of credit due to the emer-
gence of monetarist thinking and the
overriding influence of Keynesian
thought on “Liquidity Preference” that
stressed the importance of money rather
than credit (Gertler (1988). As pro-
posed by Stiglitz and Greenwald
(2003), a new monetary policy para-
digm should really be re-focusing its
attention toward the importance of sup-
ply and demand for credits into the
economy.
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Within this context, this section
tries to overview the implication of
banks’ behavior in adjusting their bal-
ance sheets on the effectiveness of
monetary policies in Indonesia.5
Alamsyah and Goeltom (2004) noted
that during the peak of the crisis, there
are strong indications that the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy transmis-
sion via banking channel had been sig-
nificantly lower, with, for instance, a
smaller sensitivity of loan rates to
changes in SBI rates during the crisis
as compared to pre crisis period. Two
major factors are responsible for this
condition. First, economic crisis and its
impact on mounting NPLs had in-
creased banks’ perception on default
risks very significantly. This factor
reduced banks’ willingness to increase
loan rates as a respond to higher policy
rates in order not to worsen their NPLs.
Second, as most borrowers experienced
huge solvability problems, they became
more sensitive to loan rate changes.
This factor reduced banks’ ability to
increase loan rates without losing their
good customers. Both factors were so
dominant that they overshadowed the
incentive to increase loan interest rev-
enues to cover the losses from higher
NPLs .
As borrowers were more sensi-
tive to loan rate changes and banks
suffered huge losses from higher NPLs,
the negative impact of higher policy
rates on loans volume were larger dur-
ing crisis. Meanwhile, as default risks
were substantially high, the opportu-
nity cost of extending credit was higher
than the opportunity cost of holding
idle fund (fund “trapped” in bad debts,
reserve requirement, and excess re-
serves). These made loan rates less
sensitive to policy rates relative to
deposit rates. Consequently, the in-
crease in SBI rates increased deposit
rates much faster than the increase in
loan rates creating negative interest
margin.
Furthermore, it can be shown also
that the improvement of monetary
policy transmission has been very slow
during the post crisis period. The sen-
sitivity of loan rates to policy rates
changes increased only slightly, and
still lower than the sensitivity during
pre crisis period. Although banks’ per-
ception on default risk had improved
significantly, banks were still very
cautious as evidenced by higher CAR
ratio than required by regulation. The
positive income effect of smaller NPLs
has also reduced the incentive for banks
to fully respond any changes in policy
rates. Both factors have resulted in
slower decline of loan rates than the
decrease in SBI rates during the pe-
riod.
The sensitivity of loan volumes to
policy rates changes has also been
declining during the post crisis period,
with even lower levels than during the
pre crisis period. Banks are still very
cautious in extending credits as evi-
denced in higher CAR ratio. In addi-
5 A simple model of banking channel has been designed to address bank’s behavior and is impact
on monetary policy transmission during the crisis.
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tion to that, smaller NPLs ratio has
reduced banks’ loses significantly. This
situation has reduced the need from
banks to increase loan supply to cover
losses from NPLs. On the other hand,
as borrowers are not suffering from
solvability problems so heavily as dur-
ing peak  crisis times, demand for loans
is less sensitive to interest rate changes.
Consequently, as the monetary authori-
ties reduced the policy rates to boost
aggregate demand, the increase is rela-
tively slower than if the same policy
were conducted pre crisis. Also, as
banks are still maintaining higher CAR,
the opportunity cost of extending credit
is still higher than the opportunity cost
of holding idle fund (which is declining
as NPLs are smaller). This makes loan
rates still less sensitive to policy rates
relative to deposit rates. Consequently,
lower SBI rates reduce deposit rates
faster than loan rates (the positive spread
between both rates widens).
From the above exploration, it can
be concluded that there are indications
that bank’s balance sheet adjustment,
which has led to bank disintermediation,
has reduced the effectiveness of mon-
etary policies during the crisis and post
crisis period. Structural changes and
balance sheet adjustment in banks and
borrowers have altered the smoothness
and effectiveness of monetary policies.
As banks are still the major source of
financing in Indonesia, this situation
contributes to the current slower pace
of economic recovery compared to other
countries that experienced similar cri-
sis.
Macroeconomic Management to
Strengthen Financial Markets
Development of Bond Market
Lack of diversified sources of funds
and over-reliance on foreign capital
flows, in particular the un-hedged pri-
vate short-term borrowings in foreign
currencies, have worsened the situa-
tion. As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, in Indonesia as in most of East
Asia, the banking sector has been the
major source of domestic financing.
Capital markets have traditionally been
embryonic, and in limited occasions
issues got priced, in usual amounts.
The inadequacies of Asia’s capital
markets have been the flipside of a
dominant banking sector that has inter-
mediated more than 80 percent of the
region’s investment, much more in the
case of Indonesia, as shown in Figure
10. The Indonesian Government recog-
nizes that rehabilitating the banking
sector alone will not be enough to
strengthen the financial system. It is
also imperative to encourage efficient
and diversified capital intermediation
to ensure sustainable economic growth.
Even though capital markets and
the banking sector were deregulated in
swift reforms in 1988, bond markets in
Indonesia have never been adequately
developed, let alone liquid. Only in
1998, and as a consequence of the
Asian Financial crisis, did the Govern-
ment begin to issue Recapitalization
Bonds. However, these instruments
were issued solely to recapitalize the
banking sector and to support Bank
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Indonesia’s Liquidity Support opera-
tions, and not to begin the process of
building a domestic bond market. The
securities were placed directly with
the banks in exchange for non-per-
forming loans and were not auctioned
in the market. In fact, the necessary
legal, settlement and clearing infra-
structure did not exist at the time. This
made trading difficult and most of the
“recap” banks kept their bonds in their
investment accounts.
Co ordination between the Cen-
tral Bank, the Ministry of Finance and
Figure 11. Government Bond Maturity Profiles
Figure 10. Domestic Sources of Indonesian Economic Development (percent)
Source: Bank Indonesia, Ministry of Finance
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other supervisory agencies in design-
ing the strategy to establish a well-
developed and functioning Government
bond market in the country is therefore
vital. In line with stable stock market
conditions in 2003, Government bonds
market became more liquid and effi-
cient. However, a close watch is still
necessary due to re-financ-ing and un-
der-subscriptions, which could erode
government credibility and the
sustainability of state budget financ-
ing. Recent developments (Figure 11)
show that large amounts of Govern-
ment bonds will mature in the 2004-
2013 period, which narrows long-term
options for Government bond refinanc-
ing. This was one of the factors behind
several cases of under-subscription of
Government bond issuance in 2003.
In line with the developments of
the Government bond market, the cor-
porate bond market has also improved
markedly. This is evidenced by the
rising value of new bond issuances and
market capitalization. However, such
rapid developments necessitate close
monitoring due to potential and sys-
temic risks. A sharp rise (of 60%) in the
corporate bond price index during 2003
made an important contribution to the
Indonesian capital market. Liquidity in
the corporate bond market has picked
up in term of both price and value of
bonds issued. However, a number of
issuers had questionable fundamentals.
In this regard, debt to equity ratios
remained high in several sectors, such
as textiles, property, and pulp and pa-
per, suggesting continued vulnerabil-
ity.
Implementation of The Indonesian
Banking Architecture
The Architecture represents an
urgent need for the Indonesian banking
system in order to strengthen the funda-
mentals of the banking industry. The
1997 economic crisis demonstrated that
Indonesia’s banking industry lacked
the proper institutional basis, and there-
fore requires strengthening of funda-
mentals to be able to withstand internal
and external shocks. Lack of strong
fundamentals in the banking system
represents a challenge not only for the
banking industry as a whole, but also
for Bank Indonesia as the authority
responsible for bank supervision.
Building a more robust banking
system requires improvements to be
made in many different areas, includ-
ing: (i) Low capacity for growth in
bank lending, (ii) Structural weak-
nesses, (iii) Banking services failing to
satisfy public needs, (iv) Bank supervi-
sion, (v) Weak capabilities, (vi) Unsus-
tainable profitability and operating ef-
ficiency levels, (vii) Customer protec-
tion, and (viii) Advancements in Infor-
mation Technology.
To fulfill the vision and objectives
of the Indonesian Banking Architec-
ture and respond to the challenges con-
fronting the banking system, the six
pillars of the Indonesian Banking Ar-
chitecture described above will be put
into place through a number of work
programs outlined as follows:
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1. Program for reinforcing the
structure of the national bank-
ing system. This program is aimed
at reinforcing the capital of com-
mercial banks (conventional and
sharia) to strengthen bank capac-
ity for business and risk manage-
ment, develop information tech-
nology, and expand the scale of
business in order to support in-
creased capacity for bank credit
expansion. In overall terms, the
structure envisaged for the Indo-
nesian banking system in the next
ten to fifteen years is described as
Figure 12.
2. Program for improvement in
quality of banking regulation.
This program is aimed at improv-
ing the effectiveness of regulation
conducted by Bank Indonesia and
achieving compliance with regu-
latory standards based on interna-
tional best practices. The program
can be achieved through improve-
ments in bank policy-making pro-
cesses and by phasing in the com-
prehensive application of the 25
Basle Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision.
3. Program for improvement of the
supervisory function. This pro-
gram aims at improving the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of bank
supervision conducted by Bank
Indonesia. This objective will be
achieved by improving the com-
petency of bank examiners, im-
proving coordination among su-
pervisory agencies, development
Figure 12. Structure Envisaged for the Indonesian Banking System
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of risk-based supervision, more
effective enforcement and con-
solidation of the banking sector
organization within Bank Indone-
sia.
4. Program for quality improve-
ments in bank management and
operations. This program is fo-
cused on improving good corpo-
rate governance, quality of risk
management, and operational
management capabilities. It is ex-
pected that higher standards of
GCG supported by strong opera-
tional capability (including risk
management) will lead to higher
operating performance in the
banking system.
5. Program for development of
banking infrastructure. This pro-
gram is aimed at developing sup-
porting infrastructure for effec-
tive banking operations, such as a
credit bureau, domestic credit rat-
ing agency and a credit guarantee
scheme. Development of the credit
bureau will assist the banking sys-
tem in improving the quality of
lending decisions. The use of
credit rating agencies in publicly-
traded debt held by banks will
improve the transparency and ef-
fectiveness of bank financial man-
agement. Similarly, the develop-
ment of a credit guarantee scheme
will increase public access to
credit.
6. Program for improvement of cus-
tomer protection. This program is
aimed at empowering customers
through the establishment of a
mechanism for customer com-
plaints, establishment of an inde-
pendent mediation agency, im-
proved transparency of informa-
tion on banking products and edu-
cation to customers.
Concluding Remarks
The economic and financial crisis
hitting Indonesia since mid-1997 has
triggered a significant economic down-
turn. By examining balance sheet con-
ditions across various sectors in the
economy, it is shown that despite some
progress, the overall balance sheet
conditions are still vulnerable to fur-
ther shocks. Hence, efforts to restore
growth and stability still face great
challenges. The vulnerability of bal-
ance sheet had propagation impacts to
the whole economy. As experienced
by Indonesia and other Asian coun-
tries, it has been empirically shown
that the vulnerability of the corporate
sector propagated to the banking sec-
tor as the key player in financial mar-
kets, and onto the other sectors. There-
fore, an urgent action was implemented
by the Indonesian macroeconomic
policy makers focusing on the efforts
to strengthen financial markets, among
others, by developing bond markets
and implementing a strong banking
architecture.
The results are encouraging as
shown by various macroeconomic in-
dicators. Economic growth has con-
tinuously increased up to nearly 5 per-
cent in 2003, while inflation reached a
record low of 5 percent, exchange rate
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has appreciated and stabilized at around
Rp 8,800 per US dollar and the 1-
month interest rate Central Bank Cer-
tificate benchmark (SBI) declined to a
historical low of 7.4 percent.
However, various constraints re-
main and the recovery process is yet to
be accelerated. The banking system is
still struggling to improve its risk man-
agement capacity, with a remaining
reluctance to restart lending and a pref-
erence towards investment in Govern-
ment Bonds and Central Bank Certifi-
cates. The challenge is to speed up
institutional reform so that credit lend-
ing and other funding sources can re-
sume to support higher investment
growth. Debt restructuring and struc-
tural reform will have to be pursued in
order to avoid the same recurrence of
crisis. Policy coordination in develop-
ing the bond market and conducting
prudent monetary and fiscal policies is
equally crucial, but is fortunately le-
gally supported and benefits from an
independent Central Bank.
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The Establishment of the Government Guarantee Scheme was intro-
duced in January 1998 with the objective of regaining public confidence to
the banking system. The blanket guarantee covers all third party liabilities
of the banks. Members of the blanket guarantee program are banks incorpo-
rated in Indonesia. The guarantee has been a great burden to the government;
nonetheless, removing it too early before the banking system had been put on
a sound condition could jeopardize the gains it has benefited. Clear evidence
that banks are progressing towards achieving a sustainable and prudent level
of capital and are not sliding backwards towards insolvency should be
warranted before lifting the scheme. Given this fact, the government has
determined that the current blanket guarantee should be ended by 2004. On
that account, the government shall institute a formal deposit protection
scheme by establishing a Deposit Insurance Agency.
The Establishment of IBRA was conducted on January 6, 1998 under
Presidential Decree. The main tasks of IBRA are as follows: (i) To nurse the
unhealthy banks transferred from Bank Indonesia, (ii) To settle assets and
liabilities of closed banks through an Asset Management Unit (iii) To
restructure companies, (iv) To sell assets of closed banks and to settle the
guarantee funds from the Government.
The Recapitalization of Banks is aimed at preserving the viability of
banks having prospect to operate under a sound and healthy banking
practice. The program started from the accomplishment of due diligence
conducted by Bank Indonesia together with International Auditors for 198
banks (excluding 10 branch offices of foreign banks). To this point, the
government has recapitalized 36 banks, comprising 7 private national banks,
4 Taken-Over Banks in 1998, 9 Taken-Over Banks in 1999, 12 Regional
Development Banks, and 4 State-Owned Banks. In the course of the
recapitalization program, the Government has issued bonds reaching IDR
433.21 trillion in nominal (around USD 50 billion in 1999), encompassing
floating and fixed rate bonds, as well as hedge bonds, which stood at IDR
219.48 trillion, IDR 174.7 trillion, and IDR 39.03 trillion respectively.
Appendix 1
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Appendix 2. Socio-Politic and Economic Events of 1997 – 2003
Period Socio-Politic Economy
1997
July Beginning of the financial crisis in Indonesia
Bank Indonesia (BI) widens the band of exchange rate
intervention
August The Government implements a fully flexible exchange
rate system
September BI reintroduces  Money Market Securities and reduces
Reserve Requirement on non-rupiah
November The government  adopts the IMF Stabilization Program
Liquidation of 16 insolvent commercial banks
1998
January Political and security situation worsens Moody’s and S&P 500 reduced Indonesia’s rating  to
“non-investment rating”
The government established  Indonesia Banking Restruc-
turing Agency (IBRA) , followed by
the introduction of the Blanket Guarantee Program
The issue of Currency Board Arrangement is raised
May Social riot of 12 May
Resignation of Soeharto as Indonesia’s
President, replaced by B.J. Habibie
July Announcement of CGI commitment
August Liquidation of  3 insolvent commercial banks
September Debt restructurization
1999
May Establishment of the Act No.23/1999 regarding
Bank Indonesia
August Abdul R. Wahid is assigned as the 4th
Indonesia President
2000
January Cabinet Reshuffle issues
Riots at Maluku and Mataram
February Resignation of General Wiranto from Acceptance of IMF loan (liquid)
the Cabinet
May Jakarta (Glodok) riot
Demonstration and riot in front of
Presidential palace
July Conflict between Parliament and President
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Continued from Appendix 2
(Socio-Politic and Economic Events of 1997 – 2003)
Period Socio-Politic Economy
2001
January Political situation accelerates due to the
Memorandum II to A.R. Wahid
March Riots at Sampit and Ambon The relationship between Government and IMF
 worsens.
Deterioration of Indonesia’s rating outlook
(Moody’s and S&P)
April Suspension of IMF loan acceptance
June Pressures to conduct Special Assembly
of the General People Council
July Public rejection to the President’s proposal Improvement of Indonesia’s rating  outlook (S&P)
to dismiss Parliament
Special Assembly of the General People
Council
Resignation of A.R. Wahid as Indonesia’s
President, replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri
August External supports for the new Government
September World Trade Center Tragedy
October Increasing social tension and anti-
American sentiments
November Deterioration of Indonesia’s rating and  outlook (S&P)
Extension of CGI commitment for 2002
December IBRA assets sold to foreign investors
2002
January IMF approves the loan acceptance (USD341 millions)
March Disinvestment of a commercial bank (BCA)
Trend Bullish of Asia currencies
April Paris Club III rescheduling
Deterioration of Indonesia’s  credit rating (S&P)
May Strengthening of Asian currencies
June London Club rescheduling
IMF approves the loan acceptance (USD358 millions)
August Annual Assembly of the General People Sing Tel Singapore buys Telkomsel’s shares
Council Weakening of the Yen
FITCH raises Indonesia’s credit rating
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Continued from Appendix 2
(Socio-Politic and Economic Events of 1997 – 2003)
Period Socio-Politic Economy
September S&P raises Indonesia’s credit rating
October Bali Tragedy (bombing)
November Fed Fund Rate decreases
Disinvestment of 51% Bank Niaga’s shares
December Arrangement between the Indonesian Loan acceptance from IMF
government and Aceh Liberalization Disinvestment of 41,9% Indosat’s shares
Movement (GAM)
2003
January Public demonstration to reject price increases CGI Meeting approves a new commitment
Deal between Indonesia and the IMF regarding
the economic reform program
March America attacks Iraq
August JW Marriot Hotel Tragedy (bombing)
